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A REPLY TO ROVIRA: CAN THE “IMPERFECTION” OF MY 
PHILOSOPHY OF PURE PERFECTIONS BE OVERCOME? 
 
Josef Seifert 
 
In his excellent paper “Perfection and Imperfection of Josef Seifert’s Theory of 
Pure Perfections,” Rogelio Rovira has formulated with precision Anselm of 
Canterbury’s philosophical discovery of the pure perfections and Duns 
Scotus‘ refinements of this teaching. He has further attributed to me, more than 
generously, eight improvements of the philosophy of pure perfections. In the last 
part of his essay, he has asked two excellent questions about my philosophy of 
pure perfections which to answer, as well as I am able to, is my present task. 
Rovira thinks that I have never addressed the first of these two questions, at least 
not adequately.
1
 The other issue arises from distinctions expressly proposed by 
me but has not been sufficiently treated yet. He kindly describes what he means 
by “imperfections,” rather than in terms of faults, as parts of my position that 
stand in need of further investigations and are perfectible. In spite of these 
imperfections, he even bestows the title doctor perfectionum on me, an honor I 
certainly do not deserve as long as I have no answers for him. 
1. The relationship between pure perfection and value. 
Rovira notes that I follow “Hildebrand’s axiology, according to which the 
term value can only be properly applied to ‘the intrinsically important’, to the 
positive importance of what is intrinsically good and precious.” 
He points out that Hildebrand and I both distinguish four types of the 
intrinsically important and, therefore, four kinds of specifically distinct values. (1) 
Qualitative values, which include the family of moral values (characterized by the 
basic and intrinsic importance of moral goodness), the domain of the so-called 
intellectual values (such as intellectual acuity, wit, intellectual depth and 
brilliance), and the realm of aesthetic values (centred on the intrinsic importance 
of beauty). (2) Ontological values, that is, values “rooted” or “embodied” in the 
specific nature of beings. (3) The values of perfection or technical values, which 
                                                             
1Perhaps I came close to addressing it in my “The Idea of the Good as the Sum-total of 
Pure Perfections. A New Personalistic Reading of Republic VI and VII”, in: Giovanni 
Reale and Samuel Scolnikov (Ed.), New Images of Plato. Dialogues on the Idea of the 
Good, (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2002), S. 407-424. 
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are based on the immanent perfection of a capacity. (4) The formal value of 
“being something.”2 
Now Rovira notes: 
On the one hand, the notion of value or intrinsic importance does not seem to 
be identical to the notion of pure perfection, to ‘being better’ in such an absolute 
way that it is impossible to surpass it without possessing it. Although all pure 
perfection entails a value, not all-pure perfection is properly a value. Love is, 
according to Josef Seifert, a pure perfection, and it definitely has a value. However, 
love is not properly a value, but an “affective response” to value. Moreover, it is 
also clear that not all value is a pure perfection. The qualitative value of the “beauty 
of the visible and the audible”, for instance, is not a pure perfection, and the same is 
true of intellectual depth, the energy of the will or the ontological value of the 
corporeal living being.” 
I of course agree entirely with both of these assertions (as long as “energy of 
the will” and “intellectual depth” refer only to finite human or angelic qualities). 
To the second one, I might add that most certainly none of the ontological 
values of particular individual finite beings and of their species and genera, 
values that are inseparably connected with these natures (of roses, lions, elephants, 
etc.) in their finitude, is pure perfections. Thus, there are indeed countless values, 
which are not pure perfections.  
Rovira continues: “On the other hand, however: can there conceivably be a 
                                                             
2See Dietrich von Hildebrand, Ethics (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1972), Part I 
(English original edition: Christian Ethics, New York: David McKay Company, 1953. 
Definitive German edition: Ethik, in D. v. H., Gesammelte Werke, hrsg. von der Dietrich 
von Hildebrand Gesellschaft, (Regensburg-Stuttgart: Josef Habbel-W. Kohlhammer, 
1971-1984, 10 vols., vol. II, 1973) and Ästhetik 1 (Gesammelte Werke, vol. V, 1977). See 
Josef Seifert, Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit (Salzburg-München: Universitätsverlag 
Anton Pustet, 19722), 274-290, Was ist und was motiviert eine sittliche Handlung? 
(Salzburg-München: Universitätsverlag Anton Pustet, 1976), “Being and Value. Thoughts 
on the Reform of the Metaphysics of Good within Value Philosophy,” Aletheia I, 2 (1977), 
328-336, “Dietrich von Hildebrands philosophische Entdeckung der ‘Wertantwort’ und der 
Grundlegung der Ethik,” Aletheia V (1992), 34-58. See also Rogelio Rovira, “On the 
Manifold Meaning of Value according to Dietrich von Hildebrand and the Need for a 
Logic of the Concept of Value,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 89 (2015), 
115-132. 
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difference between the absolute goodness of the intrinsic importance and the 
absolute goodness of the “being better” belonging to the pure perfection? How 
are we to understand a relationship between value and pure perfection, which is 
different to that of identity? Is there really a difference between the goodness or 
excellence proper to value and the goodness or excellence in being? 
In short, we can clearly see that the notion of value and the notion of pure 
perfection do not seem to be identical, yet we cannot see a difference between the 
axiological goodness or positiveness of value and the ontological goodness or 
positiveness of pure perfection. Here we touch on a new aspect of the mystery in 
the relationship between value and being which deserves further investigation.” 
In order to answer this question, I would first like to refer to my elaboration 
of three fundamentally different “directions” in which being distinguishes itself 
from non-being: reality, intelligibility, and value.
3
 While there are many relations 
between them, they still are quite different. For example, the crimes committed in 
Auschwitz are superior in reality to the kindness of Cordelia in Shakespeare’s 
King Lear. However, the more real they are, the greater is their disvalue.
4
 But if 
the overwhelmingly generous and kind love Cordelia shows to her father in a 
theatre play were to become real, the superior reality of her love and forgiveness 
would of course also increase and transform the value of her imaginary good 
actions into real morally good actions. In a similar way, one might encounter a 
perfectly intelligible curve in mathematics as compared to a much less intelligible 
but noble human love. Yet, no doubt, the higher intelligibility does not make the 
curve more valuable than love. Now, I think that pure perfections are found in all 
of these three dimensions of being: reality, intelligibility and value. However, two 
comments are needed: 
i) Intelligibility is a pure perfection but not the intelligibility 
of a necessarily finite object, such as of the solution of a 
chess problem or the formula of a curve, just as the 
ontological value of a giraffe is not a pure perfection. 
ii) The perfections of reality and intelligibility are only 
perfections if they are also bearers of value; and they are 
pure perfections only inasmuch they are open to infinity. 
                                                             
3Josef Seifert,  
4See my long critical discussion of the theory that evils are only the conspicuous absence 
of due good. 
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Let us read the very precise formulation Rovira gives to the second problem: 
 
“2. The second issue refers to the question of the communicability of pure 
perfections and the incommunicability of the person. 
Josef Seifert accepts Duns Scotus’ thesis that every pure perfection is 
communicable, i.e. shareable by more than one subject.
 
This thesis, however, poses 
a difficult problem for Seifert’s conception of to be a person as pure perfection.5 
Certainly, to be a person always involves incommunicability in terms of the 
individual being, because only a unique being, incommunicable and profoundly 
individual, can be a person. How, then, can to be a person be a pure perfection and 
thus communicable? 
In his response to this objection, Seifert begins by distinguishing between to 
be a person and to be this or that person. The former, but not the latter, is a pure 
perfection, for the essence of the person involves a personal identity and being an 
inalienable, irreplaceable individual, but not being this person instead of that one. 
Seifert then makes a further distinction between pure perfections and 
properties, which are neither pure nor mixed perfections. To be this unique person 
rather than another one, Seifert asserts, is neither pure perfection, which it would 
be absolutely better to have than not to have, nor mixed perfection. This 
haecceitas, or uniqueness, is a type of perfection, which, in Seifert’s own words, 
“is beyond the difference between pure and mixed perfection”.6 
Josef Seifert even grants a theological significance to this philosophical 
distinction between pure and mixed perfections on the one hand, and perfections, 
which are beyond this distinction, such as in the above case of specific personal 
identity, on the other hand. He considers it the “key” to a little better understanding 
of the Trinitarian mystery, where no divine person lacks any perfection, yet each 
divine person is distinct from the other.
7
 
Rovira renders my two replies to this question very precisely: It is indeed a 
pure perfection to be a person and to have a unique incommunicable identity. 
Nevertheless, it is not a pure perfection to be this instead of that person. On 
purely philosophical grounds, this seems evident in relation to human persons: it 
can never be absolutely better to be me than to be you. On the level of the divine 
                                                             
5See Seifert, “Essere persona come perfezione pura,” 68-75.  
6Seifert, “Essere persona come perfezione pura,” 71.  
7See Seifert, “Essere persona come perfezione pura,” 72-3.  
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person, this does not seem to be evident. Rather, one would have to assume that 
in the case of the divine person the individual thisness and uniqueness of the 
divine person is inseparable from the divine necessary existence, where one 
cannot conceive of the possibility that another person would have become God. 
Therefore, the unique and unrepeatable personal thisness of a divine person seems 
to be a pure perfection and differ essentially from finite persons. However, it is 
evident that for a Christian it is necessary to apply the intuition that to be this 
person instead of another one cannot be a pure perfection applies also to God. For 
the negating, this of God would deny Holy Trinity, the three-personhood of God. 
For if it were a pure perfection to be the Father instead of being the Son, the Son 
would lack an infinite pure perfection, and vice versa. 
At the same time, from a point of view of Trinitarian theology, to be “this 
person” instead of another one cannot be an essentially limited (mixed) perfection 
either because this would again contradict the infinite divine perfection. 
Rovira points out that the ontological status of perfections, which are 
“beyond” the difference between pure and mixed perfections raises some 
problems. He formulates: 
What does it mean to be “beyond” the above distinction? On a logical plane, 
we can understand the concept of perfection without taking into account the 
difference between essentially unrestricted perfection and essentially limited 
perfection, in the same way as we can represent the notion of animal without regard 
to the difference of “rational” and “irrational”. Nevertheless, all animals, which 
actually exist, are necessarily either rational or irrational. Can there really be an 
actual perfection, which is neither capable of infinity nor incapable of infinity? Can 
a perfection, which is by nature “indifferent”, so to speak, to the distinction 
between the infinite and the finite be predicated of the divine persons? 
In light of Rovira’s penetrating questions, I wish to propose another solution 
to this mystery, without invoking the thesis that personal identity of this person 
(instead of another one) is neither a pure (and in God actually infinite) perfection, 
nor mixed and necessarily limited perfection. This other solution is not in 
contradiction to the previous one but adds an important point missing from the 
one Rovira criticizes. 
From the perspective of a Trinitarian faith, one could reconcile the 
impossibility that the haecceitas of the divine persons falls outside the divine 
essence and outside the identity and purest perfection of the divine being. Thus 
with the impossibility that it would be a pure perfection to be the Father or the 
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Holy Spirit instead of being the Son, etc... We could say that the unique 
haecceitas of each and of all of the three divine persons is of the divine essence. 
In this sense their identity as three unique persons who are identical with God is a 
pure perfection, but not the being one of them instead of the other one. In other 
words, no other person could be God and have the divine nature except uniquely 
these three persons and no others. 
Rovira continues with his excellent critical questions: 
Moreover, how can the nature or essence of perfection be characterised, such 
as the individual identity of each specific person, if this perfection is, according to 
Seifert, “beyond” the distinction between pure and mixed perfections? Is the 
essence of this perfection communicable to each and every person? If so, how can 
this perfection explain the individuality of this particular person? Alternatively, is 
the essence of this perfection, in fact, radically incommunicable? In this case, 
how can we understand its nature as a perfection? Why do we call it perfection? 
The aporia presented by the communicable nature of the pure perfection 
involved in being a person, and the inherent incommunicability of each individual 
person therefore requires further thought. Moreover, theologians must explain a 
further problem: the aporia of the difference between finite persons, who exist in 
individually different natures, and the divine persons, who exist in one numerically 
indivisible nature. 
Rovira puts his finger on a great difficulty, which Rodrigo Guerra López 
also raised in the discussion. But unlike Guerra López, Rovira does not deny that 
to be a person is a pure perfection but formulates very precisely the apory that 
appears to us as a contradiction: 
The aporia presented by the communicable nature of the pure perfection 
involved in being a person, and the inherent incommunicability of each individual 
person. 
To this mysterious question, I wish to reply in the following way: 
In general, we may say that “communicability” to more than one subject 
cannot mean that some general nature is communicated in the sense that it would 
enter the individual as the numerically same and as general essence. Rather, in 
general, not only in persons, the generic and specific essential characteristics of an 
individual are in the individual as fully individual essence of this individual, and of 
its unique essence inasmuch as this essence is in the individual. The aporia 
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presented by the communicable nature of the pure perfection involved in being a 
person, and the inherent incommunicability of each individual person.
8
 
1．Certainly, this applies in a very new sense to persons of whom Spaemann 
therefore said “Person ist kein sortaler Begriff”.9 “Person” does not mean a “sort 
of thing”. Rather only, the individual person is a person. Nevertheless, there 
exists a general “essence” of personhood, which is communicable only in the 
sense that it is “the intelligible plan realized in each individual person”. Therefore, 
it is of the essence of the person to have a unique and incommunicable thisness. 
Moreover, each feature of the general essence of the person: intellect, will, heart, 
etc. is absolutely unique in each person. Therefore, we must dispel the idea that 
the communicable essence enters into, and is individualized by, some principle of 
individuation in the individual. Rather it is a universal “essence” or essential plan 
of personhood that can solely exist as entirely individual essence in and of each 
person. 
2. If we understand communicability in this sense, there is no more 
contradiction between being a person being absolutely better than not being a 
person and than anything incompatible with it, and the absolutely 
incommunicable individuality of each person. 
3. Moreover, when we come to the level of the person, we find an entirely 
new sense of communicability: not the fact that the universal “essence of 
personhood” is present in each person and unites him or her in virtue of a 
universal plan according to which each exists. Rather, the specific personal 
communicability is entirely grounded in the individual and irreplaceable 
uniqueness of the person. It is a communicability through knowledge, through 
love, through community, etc. On this issue and its role in the dialogue between 
Christian and Jewish religion with Eastern religions in Ismael Quiles.
10
  
                                                             
8 See Josef Seifert, Sein und Wesen. Philosophie und Realistische Phänomenologie/ 
Philosophy and Realist Phenomenology. Studien der Internationalen Akademie für 
Philosophie im Fürstentum Liechtenstein/Studies of the International Academy of 
Philosophy in the Principality Liechtenstein, (Hrsg./Ed.), Rocco Buttiglione and Josef 
Seifert, Band/Vol. 3 (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1996), ch. 1, On Essence. 
9Personen. Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen ‘etwas’ und ‘jemand’ (Stuttgart: 
Klett-Cotta, 1996). 
10Ismael Quiles, “La personalidad e impersonalidad del absoluto segun las filosofias de 
oriente y occidente,” in: Sociedad Católica Mexicana de Filosofía, ed., El Humanismo y la 
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Understood in this way, then, the two senses of the “communicability,” and 
neither one of them, stands in contradiction to the truth that “being a person” is a 
pure perfection, i.e., that being a person is absolutely better to anything 
incompatible with being a person. 
Calling being a person a “pure perfection,” however, does not deny that for 
accidental reasons, such as the incorrigible evilness of a person, it could be better 
to be a person but a dog, or not even to be born, than to be a person. This very 
special modification of the notion of pure perfections in persons could be better 
clarified by the distinctions between four dimensions and meanings of human 
dignity.
11
 
                                                                                                                                          
Metafisica Cristiana en la Actualitad, Segundo Congreso Mundial de Filosofía Cristiana, 
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